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September 30 - Virilio and Victory Garden, Day 1

Page history last edited by Kelsey 15 years, 6 months ago

Summary

 

During Tuesday's class we started off discussing a number of untouched concepts brought up by Baudrillard, including the role of virtual reality in war, how the image of war matters just as much as the war itself, the medium and message of war, and the reasons people defend why the Gulf War did not take place.  

 

Once we moved on to Virilio, we started off with a lively discussion of the importance of the public being a critic of the media.  As Virilio pointed out, being a critic doesn't have to have a negative connotation.  In fact, it is necessary to criticize the current technologies, especially in times of war, as it shapes our perceptions of what is going on in the world.  One of the messages of technology and the ability that the media had in broadcasting the Gulf War was that the media had the ability to create the message of the "war".  It was CNN's constant footage and reporting that created the message of a "war" taking place.  This brought the class to the conclusion that the speed of the medium is the true message.  

 

The speed of the medium led into our discussion of what real time is and how it affects the public's abilities to make rational decisions.  A point was brought up that in reality, people don't always have time to make rational decisions.  Rather, they must take the information they have received and make a decision instantly.  The question was raised if it is better to see something too late or to early?

 

Consequently, our discussion moved onto the difference between an accident and an attack.  Virilio used the example of the stealth fighter to illustrate the use of a machine to attack in real time.  With a stealth fighter, you can't see the machine until it's on top of you dropping things.  It is too late to react.  Clearly, the stealth fighter was invented to use for attacks.  But as our class discussed, the accident of the stealth fighter was that someone was going to shoot it down.  

 

All of this discussion culminated into one challenge Virilio presents the reader with: to objectively question the concept of real time as it is portrayed in the media.  

 

 

Passages

 

One of Virilio's main arguments, and one we discussed in class in some length, is the public's responsibility to objectively judge both the news and the news source independently.  Virilio discusses this topic in a January 1991 Interview.

 

We have been living in a complete fiction.  Faced with war, we must be not only conscientious objectors but also objectors to the objectivity of its representation (Virilio, 31).

 

Yet Virilio also comments that in order to judge the news and its source objectively, the public must have sufficient time to process the news in which they receive and how it is presented to them.  This goes back to Virilio's argument of the speed at which messages are relayed to the public.  An important point Virilio makes at the end of the January 1991 Interview is the difference between seeing an event too early and too late.  Virilio challenges the reader to think about which option is better, ultimately leading the reader to objectively view the media in both respects.

 

The essence of a stealth warplane is that we see it too late, it is already there. We did not have time to prepare ourselves to see it.  It is the same thing with the technology of real time of CNN. 

We do not have time to prepare ourselves for an event, it has already taken place.  We are summoned to accept it or refuse it.  Live television is a veritable injunction.  One does not discuss a live image, one undergoes it (Virilio, 34).

 

Virilio argues that, in the era of information warfare, how technology performs in physical space is not nearly as important as its performance in the virtual space. The aerodynamics of a stealth fighter are less important than its icodynamics, that is, the efficiency of its image in virtual reality.

 

This plane has two constraints: aerodynamics and icodynamics. Its form is linked not only to the requirements of movement in space but also to the requirements of its remote representation. It's extraordinary! That the remote image of an object should have an effect on the object itself is a very important event in the history of the image. And philosophically, it's vertiginous (Virilio 45).

 

In icodynamics, like aerodynamics, the reduction of drag is important. However, the difference lies in what holds the stealth fighter back: the equivalent of atmospheric pressure is information. The stealth fighter is an icon with a physical shape designed to maximize its performance in an electronic space.

 

Terms

 

Deterrence- A new way of waging war without actually doing anything.  One of its most known definitions concerns how the two sides of a war react to one another based on the other's actions.  However, Virilio uses deterrence as a concept that will play out in virtual war as it is portrayed by the media.  An example of the media's use of deterring behavior is when it shows hostages, causing the opposing side to react based on the images of hostages seen on television.

 

Speed- "The message." Virilio is largely concerned with how the speed of new technology influences war and our understanding of it. Speed forces us to deal with thigns as they happen.  In relating to McLuhan's arguments of the media and the message, Virilio argues that the speed of the medium is the message rather than the medium or the content. The form of Virilio's argument mirrors what he says about speed: he moves quickly between ideas and offers very little explanation as he does so.

 

Dromology- Virilio's term for the study of speed.

 

War- Categorized chronologically, Virilio identifies three types of war:

  • Mass war, which focused on inertia through the magnitude physical fortifications
  • Energy war, the result of gunpowder, in which velocity became more important than size
  • Information war, in which simulation & dissimulation overtook speed & power as the most effective means of combat (i.e. Stealth fighters).

 

Accidents- According to Virilio, the way in which technology is constructed makes things vulnerable to accidents; with every new invention comes that invention's accident. For example, the creation of the F117 fighter allows for the accident of the plane being shot down.

 

Real-Time-  Real time is, essentially, the concept of live television. The problem Virilio has with news media, especially with CNN, is the aspect of real-time that they bring to wars. The speed of the images allow the public to watch things as they happen, or at the very least, believe they are watching things as they happen. Real time makes it impossible to tell the difference between an "accident" and an attack, and as a result we have become dependent on technology to make our split-second decisions for us.

 

Links

 

Virilio and Dromology: This is an article from the Johns Hopkins University Press and the Society for Literature and Science that explores Virilio's concept of dromology.  A portion of the article goes into what we discussed in class regarding the relationship between the speed at which media is delivered and the time the public has to process this information. 

 

Cyberwar, God and Television: Interview with Paul Virilio -- An interview in which Paul Virilio discusses the effects of new media technologies on both our understanding of war and war itself.

 

Elaboration on Virilio's concept of an accident: An article that explores the relationship between technology and its creation of accidents, showing different sources from Virilio to expand upon the relationship.

 

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